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INTRODUCTION

A sign posted in a train station in Sacramento warns customers that trains
moving along the railroad tracks may be controlled electronically and without
engineers. The sign is posted because people expect to see an engineer sitting in the
engine of a moving train; and patrons may be alarmed when the trains otherwise move.
Yet I wonder whether even electronically-controlled trains should also have engineers?
Or if the sign suffices, might this approach work also for matters far beyond trains and
Sacramento.
The genesis of this symposium was the creative work of Professor Glenn
Koppel, who advocates a uniform code of state civil procedure as part of a new
federalism in state civil justice.1 Professor Koppel laments that most state procedural
rule systems are a collection of rules that are bastards, 2 orphans,3 runaways, 4 and
clones5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-my words, not his. These state
procedural rules, even if not controlled by remote federal rules, are heavily influenced
and overshadowed by them.6 Professor Koppel envisions cooperation among the
*

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, University of the Pacific McGeorge
School of Law. Thanks to Glenn Koppel, Dean Maryann Jones, the Law Review, and the rest of
Western State University College of Law for their gracious hospitality before, during, and after this
symposium.
Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of
State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1167
(2005).
See e.g. Cal. Civ. Code § 1781 (2007) (code provision incorporating part of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 into
consumer class action practice).
See e.g. Mass. R. Civ. P. 15 (text of rule prescribing relation-back of amendments is a prior iteration
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15).
See e.g. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 16, 26.1, 30(a), 33.1, 34(b), 36(b), 37(c)(1) (state rules that foreshadowed
federal efforts to constrain discovery, but with dissimilar text). See generally Carl Tobias, A Civil
Discovery Dilemma for the Arizona Supreme Court, 34 ARiz. ST. L.J. 615, 625-628 (2002).
See e.g. Ohio R. Civ. P. 8 (replicating Federal Rule). While this volume was in production, the
2007 Style Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, thereby disturbing the
replica status of some state procedural rules. A few states will likely replicate soon.
See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354 (2002/
2003); Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of
Intra-State Uniformity in Three States that Have Not Adopted the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,
46 ViLL. L. REv. 311 (2001).
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engineers of state procedural rules to assert a leadership role in civil procedure
reform-to compete with the federal model and to leverage the power of procedure. 7
I share Professor Koppel's enthusiasm for procedural uniformity." And I, too,
believe in the awesome power of procedure to vindicate substantive rights 9 (or to
undermine them, as the case may be). 10 But where Professor Koppel would unionize
and empower the state engineers,11 I propose outsourcing. I suggest that at least some
states could relinquish much of the task of rulemaking to a remote authority-to-wit,
the federal rulemakers. States that enact legislation conforming their procedure to the
federal model could ensure substantial intra-state uniformity and, if replicated
nationally, would generate inter-state (inter-system) uniformity.
This notion of conformity by states to the federal model is a peculiar
paradigm. On one hand, in many respects, conformity is the extant position. Indeed,
part of Professor Koppel's frustration is the lack of creativity and initiative on the part
of state governments. 12 Yet on the other hand, institutionalizing that conformity with
some formal mechanism appears to raise hackles. When floating my proposal of a
state statute conforming state procedure to the federal model, I was labeled
contemptuous of state sovereignty and ignorant about the power of procedure, among
other failings. Such criticisms I could rebut; but the tenor of their rhetoric suggested
that I had struck a nerve. And after my beloved mentor Steve Subrin told me that this
was my "dumbest idea yet," I knew that I had found my topic for this symposium.
Although I will focus here on state statutes conforming state civil procedure to
federal civil procedure, resistance to formal conformity is undoubtedly a much larger
phenomenon. For example, consider why there are no conformity statutes linking a
state's ethical code to the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility-or conformity
statutes linking state rules of evidence to the Federal Rules of Evidence-or

7.
8.
9.

10.

To be clear, not all state procedural regimes are mere copycats of or laggards to the federal model.
Professor Koppel points out that there has also been some experimentation by states that deviates
from the federal model. See Koppel, supra n. 1, at 1175.
See Koppel, supra n.1, at 1174.
Main, supra n. 6, at 311 ("So deeply is the idea of uniformity embedded in American legal thought
that many proceduralists find it difficult or unnecessary to explain why uniformity is thought to be
good.").
See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909 (1987); Lawrence B. Solum,
ProceduralJustice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181 (2004); Charles E. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code
Pleading, 60 (2d ed., West 1947); Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q.

297 (1938).
See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing ProceduralChange: Who, How, Why, and When?,

49

L. REV. 221 (1997); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1677 (2004); Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch:
The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1924 (2006); Abram Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1294-1295 (1976); Phyllis
Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans Brown & Stephen N. Subrin, Substance in the Shadow of
Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and ProceduralLaw in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV.
211 (1992); Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courtsfor Minorities,
25 HAR. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. Lms. L. REv. 341 (1990).
Koppel, supra n. 1, at 1175-1176.
See id. at 1188.
ALA.

Congress, 79

11.
12.
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conformity statutes tying commercial laws to the Uniform Commercial Code. Many
or most states in fact "adopt" these and similar regimes, but they do so episodically
and statically, rather than with dynamic legislation. Resistance to a more formalized
outsourcing is surely the product of some complex amalgam of tradition, culture,
politics, and economics. So, with or without initiative, and whether or not controlled
remotely, the state rulemakers are uniformed, trained, and in position. After all,
people expect to see an engineer sitting in the engine of a moving train; and citizens
may be alarmed when the trains otherwise move.
In this piece I consider the merits of procedural conformity statutes, and begin
to unpack the reasons for the resistance to such reforms. I suggest that one strand of
that resistance may be traceable to an oft-repeated historical narrative that recounts the
failure of conformity statutes. Under various process acts between 1789 and 1938,
federal court procedure in law cases was governed by the procedural rules of the state
court in which the federal court sat. Ultimately replaced by a set of uniform Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, conformity statutes have since been in disrepute. My narrow
effort here is to examine whether the pathogens of the earlier conformity regime would
similarly infect a state statute conforming state procedure to the federal model.

II.

DRAFTING THE STATUTE

The procedural conformity statutes that I envision require four analytical steps.
First, a state would adopt the then-current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as their
state rules of civil procedure. Second, certain terminology in the rules must be
customized for state practice. For example, rules that refer to the "procedure in the
United States district courts"1 3 must be customized to reflect the state trial courts of
general jurisdiction.
Neither of these first two steps is especially novel. Indeed, well over half the
states adopted civil rules closely patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 4
And all states have adopted at least some parts of the federal model.' 5 With regard to
the second step-customization-Professor Thomas Rowe surveyed those contours
16
decades ago.
13.
14.
15.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
Oakley, supra n. 6, at 357-358.
California, for example, has modeled Federal Rule 24(a) intervention as a matter of right, the
discovery rules 26 through 37 and 45, and also parts of Federal Rule 23, the class action rule-even
without replicating the entire corpus of the FRCP and while maintaining a reputation as among
those states least influenced by the Federal Rules. See generally John B. Oakley, The FederalRules
in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367
(1986); Charles Clark, Code Pleadingand Practice Today in David Dudley Field Centenary Essays,

67-70 (N.Y. Univ. School of Law 1949) (discussing federal rules in states and influence of federal
rules of civil procedure).
16.

See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Comment on the Federalism of the Federal Rules, DuKE L.J. 843

(1979). Professor Rowe explains that the process of customization is not only about matters of
terminology. When deciding how closely to follow the federal model, state rulemakers should also
appreciate the federalist influence that inheres in certain federal rules. Id.
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Of course the picture of intra-state uniformity has since faded. 17 States that
adopted all or substantially all of the Federal Rules for their state practice have not
kept pace with all of the subsequent amendments to the Federal Rules. 18 Hence, the
third step of the proposed conformity statute is designed to ensure a dynamic, rather
than a static conformity. Specifically, the statute must codify a process whereby later
amendments to the Federal Rules are customized for state practice and incorporated
into the state regime as a matter of course. In other words, the codified default would
be dynamic conformity, with the state incorporating all federal amendments. In the
same fashion that amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure take effect
under the Rules Enabling Act through Congressional inaction, 19 those same
amendments would be incorporated into the state rules without any formal act of
adoption by the state.
This state legislation should also include an opportunity for a state to interdict
any particular amendment to the Federal Rules from being incorporated into state
practice. And thus, the fourth step of the reform could be, say, a 90-day window
following the effective date of the federal amendment, during which a state could
affirmatively act to prevent the incorporation of the amendment into the state
procedural regime. Obviously a state would not be precluded from amending any of
its procedural rules outside the 90-day window, but the federal amendment would be
incorporated into the regime of state rules if the state did not affirmatively act within
20
that 90-day grace period.
The basic justification for the method is that any procedure that survives the
federal rulemaking gauntlet-notice and comment, Advisory Committee, Standing
Committee, Judicial Conference, the United States Supreme Court, and finally
Congressional inaction 2 1-should enjoy some rebuttable presumption of suitability for
incorporation into state procedure in the ordinary course.
The why of all this conformity was clear enough. Our goal was to
make life as simple as possible for our lawyers, particularly the young
ones as they came along, so that they could not make mistakes easily.
We believed that uniformity was more valuable than the detailed merit
of any particular rule-that the range of choice between rule
alternatives was not great enough to warrant the hazard of a lawyer
22
making a mistake by following the wrong rule.
17.
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.

See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging ProceduralPatterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999 (1989).
Oakley, supra n. 6; Thomas 0. Main, TraditionalEquity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH.
L. REV. 429 (2003).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2007).
This too evokes the mechanics of the Rules Enabling Act. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2074, Congress has at
least seven months (from on or before May 1 to December 1) to prevent the rules from taking effect.
Understand that under the conformity statute proposed here, the 90-day period between federal and
state adoption would not commence until the Federal Rule had taken effect (i.e., after the period
reserved for Congressional action).
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074.
John P. Frank, Local Rules, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2059 (1989).
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Dynamic procedural conformity could be pursued regardless of the particular
federal model then in place. And indeed I am trying to take a wide arc around the
question whether the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are the right rules for
any particular state's practice. Instead I wish to focus on conformity itself-and,
particularly, conformity statutes.

III.

EVALUATING THE PROPOSAL

Conformity invokes one of procedural reforms and reformers' most consistent
and fundamental themes-uniformity. 23 The roots and appeal of the norm of
uniformity are already well established. 24 Accordingly, I sketch here only the
advantages and disadvantages of intra-state procedural conformity. Of course
conformity could be generated by (i) dynamic conformity statutes, (ii) static
conformity statutes, 25 or (iii) by other assimilative forces such as culture. 26 In some
states the latter two of these three may already be in place, establishing some
conformity. But to the extent that conformity is beneficial and desired, dynamic
conformity statutes offer the most enduring and transparent medium of delivery. The
27
wisdom and feasibility of dynamic conformity states are analyzed in this part.
First, conformity between federal and state procedure could, over time, help
democratize federal practice. Although many lawyers practice in both federal and
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Main, supra n. 6, at 312.
See generally Subrin, supra n. 9; Subrin, supra n. 17; Janice Toran, 'Tis a Gift to Be Simple':
Aesthetics and ProceduralReform, 89 MICH. L. REV. 352 (1990).
See Main, supra n. 6.
For a discussion of how cultural forces can assimilate textually dissimilar rules see Main, supra n. 6,
at 312.
My list has an interesting parallel in Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 6
ABA J. 509 (1920), which identified the following benefits to be derived from uniform federal
rules:
(1) A modernized, simplified, scientific, correlated system of federal procedure
meeting the approval of the Federal Supreme Court and participated in by the judges
and lawyers. (2) The improvement of state court procedure through the adoption of
the federal system as a model. (3) The possibility and the probability of state
uniformity through the same course. (4) The institution of court rules in lieu of the
statutory or common law procedure modified by statute. (5) [T]he foundation for
fixed interstate judicial relations, as permanent and correlated as interstate commercial
relations. (6) The advantage of the personal participation of the lawyers and judges in
the creation and gradual perfecting of a scientific system of rules. ( 7) The certainty
of immediately detecting an imperfection and the promptness with which it can be
corrected. (8) The doing away with the longtime now necessary for the simplest relief
at the hands of Congress because of the multitude of other business pressing for
attention upon that great body of statesmen. (9) The doing away with the force of law
now possessed by every procedural statute and the substitution therefor of a system of
flexible judge-made rules, not liable to reversible error if justice be done by the
judgment entered. (10) It is the only way that nation-wide uniformity is possible, and
yet not compulsory, the psychology of which is important where state pride is an
element. (11) It will awaken a keen sense of responsibility and a new and an unselfish
participation on the part of the members of the Bench and Bar. (12) It will create an
equable division of power and duty between the legislative and judicial departments
of government.
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state courts, a divide between the bars persists. 28 Fluency with a single procedural
schemata could bridge that gap 29-although unfortunately the population learning the
new language would be the state court practitioners, already the more marginalized of
the two populations. 30 Still, a federal court practice is important for clients who might
benefit from having their case heard in a federal rather than a state court. 31 And a
federal court practice is especially important in light of Congress's recent expansion of
federal court jurisdiction to include local matters once thought to be within the
32
exclusive province of state courts.
Second, conformity could improve the federal rulemaking process. Were state
procedure tied to the federal system, a constituency much larger than federal court
28.

29.

30.

See Stephen N. Subrin & Margaret Y.K. Woo, Litigating in America: Civil Procedure in Context,
17-18, 85-90 (Aspen Publishers 2006); see generally Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant
Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on FederalJurisdictionand ConstitutionalRights, 36
UCLA L. REv. 329 (1988); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
Ironically, advocates of uniform federal rules made a similar argument:
[I]t is manifest that the small practitioner will be substantially benefited because, with
a uniform system of simple courtmade rules, he will find the door of no federal court
closed in his face and will no longer need the association of one of the expert federal
court practitioners now found at every Bar. They will start in together with the new
system. It is the experts who would be expected to oppose this bill upon selfish
grounds but they have been too patriotic to do it. The objection is as unworthy as it is
unfounded because it places the small practitioner in the attitude of being willing to
defeat improvement in the administration of justice for the sake of his personal
convenience or profit, as has been pointed out, a sentiment that we feel assured will be
promptly repudiated when brought to their attention. Report of the Committee, supra
n. 27, at 515.
Again, these arguments are recycled. A similar concern arose in the context of the debate leading to
uniform federal rules: "Some lawyers might be inconvenienced in having to learn a new system."
Id. at 514. The drafters of that Report answered:
[L]awyers have not sunk so low that they would put their personal comfort or
advantage or even their lives ahead of' the sacred duty of assuring a reasonable
certainty of justice or of improving their noble and responsible profession. Viewing it
in a lighter sense, it [is] as if one rebelled against the laws of sanitation because of the
trouble of taking a bath. The bankers have accepted and are profiting by a complete
reorganization of their business. Lawyers have sufficiently demonstrated that they are
equally as patriotic. Id.

31.

32.

The Report then addressed a similar objection "that the small practitioner and the country lawyer
could not afford to learn the new system for the few cases he would command," but answered: "This
connotes a spirit of selfishness and lack of patriotism unjust to the lawyers of small practice, who
have always stood for the best in American life and its advancement because they had the time as
well as the disposition to give thought to purely public matters. Their voice has been oftener heard
upon the Hustings than that of any other vocation." Id. at 514-515.
Richard Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform, 142-145 (Harvard University Press
1985) (discussing factors lawyers consider in choosing between federal and state court); Neal
Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal
Question Jurisdiction,41 AM. U. L. REv. 369, 395-396 (1992) (presenting survey results showing
that the removal decision is influenced by different procedures, amount of damage awards, jury
pools, judicial competence, and time-to-trial, among other perceived or actual differences); Burt
Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAuL L. REV.797,
799 (1995) (arguing that federal judges are more competent with respect to constitutional issues);
see also Liebmann, Fourteen Pointsfor the Forum Chooser, MD. B.J. 13, 13-15 (Jan. 1981) (listing
fourteen factors for practitioners to consider when choosing between federal and state court).
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2. See Symposium, 156 U. PA. L. REv. (2008)
(forthcoming).
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33
practitioners and litigants would have a stake in amendments to the Federal Rules.
Presumably this would lead to increased interest and participation in federal
rulemaking; and that increased participation, in turn, could lead to better rulemaking
34
practices-perhaps fewer and better amendments.

Third, conformity of federal and state procedure would establish a single
procedural system within a state for law schools to teach and for bar examiners to test.
Many law schools would no longer have to ignore state procedure, where, in fact,
almost all litigation in the United States occurs. 35 And under a conformity regime,
those few law schools that presently teach state procedure (and the bar examiners that
test it) could focus on the mastery of procedure's conceptual framework rather than
superficial checklists highlighting differences between the two systems.
Fourth, conformity would provide legislatures with a stable and predictable
procedural platform for drafting substantive law. For anyone who believes in the
power of procedure, there should be discomfort with the notion that the same
substantive law can be executed by fundamentally different procedural regimes. For
unless a legislature is indifferent to the level of deterrence that its law achieves, the
substantive law must include assumptions about the relevant pleading standard, joinder
36
rules, the availability vel non of broad discovery (including experts), and so forth.
For example, if a legislative enactment is calibrated such that the cause of
action includes an element of intent, that substantive law may yield one result in a
jurisdiction that has notice pleading and liberal discovery, but a different result even
with identical facts in a jurisdiction that is, say, experimenting with the pleading of
evidence, has resurrected a version of Rule 11 that is vintage 1983, allows little or no
discovery, and promises an accelerated trial date. Two cases may have the same facts
and be subject to the same substantive law; but if the two cases are subject to different
procedures, there may be different outcomes. One way of characterizing this
phenomenon is that the legislative will presumes a certain enforcement mechanism;
and the legislature deserves to know what that procedural schemata will be. Intra-state
procedural uniformity is one step closer toward greater certainty.
Fifth, and finally, conformity statutes move us closer to some sort of
approximation of procedure on a global stage. While the adoption by one state of a
dynamic conformity regime might be the tiniest of small steps, a critical mass of
adopting states would help define what is "American civil procedure." This effort is
33.
34.

35.
36.

See B. Ostrom, N. Kauder & R. LaFountain, Examining the Work of State Courts, 2001: A National
Perspectivefrom the Court Statistics Project (National Center for State Courts 2001) (recounting
that 97% of litigation in the United States occurs in state courts).
For criticism of federal rulemaking practice and results, see generally Stephen B. Burbank, The
Underlying Assumptions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Ignorance and ProceduralLaw
Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 841, 841-842 (1993); Stephen B. Burbank,
Honoring David Shapiro: Procedure,Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1677; see also Main, supra n. 18, at 479-486 (detailing the complication, trivialization, and
ossification of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
See B. Ostrom et al., supra n. 33.
See generally Thomas 0. Main, The Death of Procedure (manuscript on file with author).
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useful not only for those of us looking for an expenses-paid trip to the Hague or
elsewhere to discuss a new world order of procedure at some clothing-optional
conference where we can flaunt our French and disclaim our President. Moreover, it is
important because, as just discussed, substantive law is built upon a procedural
infrastructure. And when the substantive law is unhinged from that procedure, fidelity
to the legislative will can be compromised3 7 On the world stage-where substantive
and procedural laws can vary dramatically-this phenomenon becomes evermore
pronounced.
Of course dynamic conformity statutes could also be problematic, and there
are several concerns that deserve serious attention. First, query whether certain
characteristics that inhere in state and federal court practices demand different
procedures. After all, state courts handle much more litigation, and with a different
composition of subject-matter caseload. 8 The stakes of the typical litigation matters
may well be very different in state and federal courts; 39 the quality of lawyering and/or
judging might vary;40 there might be significantly more pro se litigants; 4 1 and so forth.
Does it follow, then, that the procedural rules should likewise be different for the two
court systems?
We might observe that, empirically, both intra-state uniformity and intra-state
disuniformity appear to work. Many states replicated the then-Federal Rules with
success. 42 And this would seem to suggest that, at least in those locales, federal and
state court practice are not necessarily so different as to require different procedural
regimes. Indeed, this should not surprise since nearly every case that proceeds in
federal court could instead be pursued in state court. 43 And, in many respects, vice
versa.44
But this is not to suggest that disuniformity cannot work. Indeed, other states
have maintained their own procedural regimes without formally adopting all of the
Federal Rules; and they have done so without seriously complicating the practice of
law or seriously undermining enforcement of the substantive law.
The evidence that substantial procedural uniformity works may be more
compelling, however, than the evidence that substantial disuniformity works. As
already mentioned, the influence of the Federal Rules on state practice has been
37.
38.
39.

See generally, Thomas 0. Main, The Death of Procedure (manuscript on file with author).
See B. Ostrom et al., supra n. 33.
Theodore Eisenberg, Use It or Pretenders Will Abuse It: The Importance of Archival Legal
Information, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2006); Larry Lyon et al., Straight From the Horse's Mouth:
Judicial Observations of Jury Behavior and the Need for Tort Reform, 59 BAYLOR L. REv. 419

(2007).
40.
41.

Posner, supra n. 31, at 143-144.
Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PuB. L. 373, 376 (2005) (reviewing statistical
analyses of federal and state court pro se matters).

42.

Oakley, supra n. 15.

43.

With few exceptions, federal court jurisdiction is concurrent with state courts. See generally
Michael Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 383 (1991);
Posner, supra n. 40, at 185.

44.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332, including revisions thereto effected by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
supra n. 32.
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tremendous. 45 And national legal education and a legal culture have a demonstrable
assimilating influence even on procedural rules that differ in form. 46 Accordingly, it is
not at all clear just how much dissimilarity presently exists between federal and state
procedures. Of course, with a more ambitious procedural federalism initiative we
might soon have a data set to examine the consequences of more profound divergence.
Second, conformity is a bad idea if the federal rulemaking process is so flawed
that any expansion of its influence should be discouraged. For example, much like the
risk associated with the broad distribution of tainted food, the dangers of something
noxious can be minimized by decentralizing its manufacturing and distribution
processes. In this metaphor we might imagine Rule 23 filling the role of California
spinach tainted with E. coli; and maybe the style amendments are the Chinese pet food
tainted with aminopterin.
That certain interests would have even more to gain by controlling the process
of federal procedural rulemaking is cause for concern. To the extent that the federal
rulemaking process is flawed, quarantine (to prevent its spread) is one response, but
surely an unsatisfactory one. That response assumes that the pathogens in the federal
rulemaking process have not also infected state rulemaking. And to the extent that
state rulemaking is not contaminated, why retreat rather than-dare I say, "surge?" As
already stated above, in a conformity regime, with the increased stakes in federal
rulemaking, there could be increased participation in the federal rulemaking process
and perhaps a slower, more thoughtful, better rulemaking process. 47
A third area of concern focuses on a host of technical issues. For example, a
state that adopted dynamic conformity legislation would have to develop a method for
dealing with all of the conflicts between a new procedural regime and the existing
corpus of substantive and procedural law. This is not an especially new phenomenon,
however, as it is not uncommon for a state to have procedures codified within
substantive laws (and substantive sections of the codes) that are inconsistent with the
more generally-applicable procedural codes or rules. Adoption of some interpretive
maxim determines whether the specific controls the general, or that the latest in time
controls, and so on. Along these same lines, a state might announce that subsequent
legislative enactments might trump the procedural rules only with a "clear statement"
of intention to do so. I see these as modest challenges many of which could even be
addressed in the exercise of drafting.
Much more significantly, the legislative enactment of dynamic conformity
statutes could run afoul of state constitutional mandates. In some states, the task of
procedural rulemaking is assigned by constitutional mandate to the judiciary. 48 In
45.

See Oakley, supra n. 6.

46.
47.

Main, supra n. 6.
See supra nn. 33-34.

48.

See e.g. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5(5) ("The Supreme Court shall have ... Power to make rules
relative to all procedural matters in any court."); Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21 ("The supreme court
shall make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts and shall make and
promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases, except that the
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others, the rulemaking authority is shared by the judicial and legislative branches. 49
Even in those many states where the legislatures have enacted statutes conferring
rulemaking authority to the courts, 50 the authority may not have been theirs to give.

49.

general assembly shall have the power to provide simplified procedures in county courts for the trial
of misdemeanors."); Mich. Const. VI, § 5 ("The supreme court shall by general rules establish,
modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts of this state."); see also Richard
S. Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CoNN. L. REv. 1
(1975-1976) (discussing exclusive power of the Connecticut judiciary over rules of practice and
procedure as implied power under state constitution).
Alaska Const. art. IV, § 15 ("The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the
administration of all courts. It shall make and promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in
civil and criminal cases in all courts. These rules may be changed by the legislature by two-thirds
vote of the members elected to each house.");
Mo. Const. art. V, § 5
The supreme court may establish rules relating to practice, procedure and pleading for
all courts and administrative tribunals, which shall have the force and effect of law.
The rules shall not change substantive rights, or the law relating to evidence, the oral
examination of witnesses, juries, the right of trial by jury, or the right of appeal. The
court shall publish the rules and fix the day on which they take effect, but no rule shall
take effect before six months after its publication. Any rule may be annulled or
amended in whole or in part by a law limited to the purpose.
Vt. Const. ch. II, § 37 ("The Supreme Court shall make and promulgate rules governing the
administration of all courts, and shall make and promulgate rules governing practice and procedure
in civil and criminal cases in all courts. Any rule adopted by the Supreme Court may be revised by
the General Assembly.");
W. Va. Code Ann. § 51-1-4
The supreme court of appeals may, from time to time, make and promulgate general
rules and regulations governing pleading, practice and procedure in such court and in
all other courts of record of this State. All statutes relating to pleading, practice and
procedure shall have force and effect only as rules of court and shall remain in effect
unless and until modified, suspended or annulled by rules promulgated pursuant to the
provisions of this section.

50.

See e.g. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-2-18(a)
The Supreme Court and the Justices thereof shall have the power to prescribe, modify,
and repeal rules of procedure, pleading, and practice in civil actions and proceedings
in the courts of this state (b) Whenever the Supreme Court adopts or prescribes any
rules under this Code section, the rules shall be reported by the court to the General
Assembly at the next regular session thereof or at an extraordinary session authorized
by law to consider and ratify them. The rules shall not take effect until they have been
ratified and confirmed by the General Assembly by an Act or resolution thereof (e)
This Code section shall not be construed as constituting an abandonment or disclaimer
of the power of the General Assembly to enact laws regulating procedure in the courts
of this state.
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4 § 8
The Supreme Judicial Court has the power to prescribe, by general rules... the forms
of process, writs, pleadings and motions and the practice and procedure in civil
actions at law ... They take effect on such date not less than 6 months after their
promulgation as the Supreme Judicial Court may fix. After their promulgation the
Supreme Judicial Court may repeal, amend, modify or add to them from time to time
with or without a waiting period. After the effective date of said rules as promulgated
or amended, all laws in conflict therewith are of no further force or effect.
Mass. G.L. c. 213 § 3
The courts shall, respectively, make and promulgate uniform codes of rules, consistent
with law, for regulating the practice and conducting the business of such courts in
cases not expressly provided for by law, for the following purposes: First, Simplifying
and shortening pleadings and procedure. Second, Prescribing the terms upon which

HeinOnline -- 35 W. St. U. L. Rev. 84 2007-2008

2007

Reconsidering Procedural Conformity Statutes

85

51
Debates about the locus of the rulemaking authority are neither new nor resolved. In
states with constitutions that allocate the rulemaking power to the legislature,
conformity legislation should be least problematic. In states where courts make rules
as a matter of legislative grace, conformity legislation could revive a simmering
controversy. And in states with constitutions expressly allocating the rulemaking
52
authority to the judiciary, state constitutional reform could be necessary.

A separate constitutional hurdle for conformity legislation could be the
propriety of what might fairly be characterized as a delegation of state authority to the
federal government. Is this tolerable? Questions about delegation running in the
opposite direction have been asked and answered. For example, the Assimilative
Crimes Act incorporates certain state criminal laws as federal law governing federal
enclaves within those states. 53 And in United States v. Sharpnack, the Act was
challenged as an unconstitutional delegation to the states of Congress's legislative
power.54 The Court rejected this argument, explaining that:
Rather than being a delegation by Congress of its legislative authority
to the States, [the Act] is a deliberate continuing adoption by Congress
for federal enclaves of such unpre-empted offenses and punishment as
amendments will be allowed... Third, Conducting trials ...Fifth, Giving a party
such notice of the evidence which is intended to be offered by the adverse party ...
Eighth, Expediting the decision of causes and securing the speedy trial thereof.
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 2.120
(1) The supreme court may make rules not inconsistent with the constitution and laws
of the state for its own government, the government of the district courts, and the
government of the State Bar of Nevada (2) The supreme court, by rules adopted and
published from time to time, shall regulate original and appellate civil practice and
procedure, including, without limitation, pleadings, motions, writs, notices and forms
of process, in judicial proceedings in all courts of the state, for the purpose of
simplifying the same and of promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its
merits.

51.

52.

53.
54.

Wyo. Stat. 5-2-114 ("The supreme court of Wyoming may from time to time adopt, modify and
repeal general rules and forms governing pleading, practice and procedure, in all courts of this state,
for the purpose of promoting the speedy and efficient determination of litigation upon its merits.").
Compare Edson Sunderland, The Exercise of the Rule-Making Power, 12 ABA J. 548, 549 (1926)
with Roscoe Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 ABA J. 599, 600 (1926); see
generally Richard S. Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8
CoNN. L. REv. 1, 34 (1975-1976) ("[T]he regulation of procedure in litigation was considered a
normal and appropriate legislative task throughout most of the nineteenth century. In the second and
third decade of [the twentieth] century, a strong movement developed to transfer the rulemaking
function to the courts."); id. at 27-43.
Reform could be necessary because a rule that prospectively incorporates other rules may not be the
sort of judicial rulemaking contemplated by the constitution. Of course the classic judicial function
is applying general rules to concrete individual situations. The authority to formulate general
rules-to apply to people and situations not specified-is traditionally a legislative function.
Although some state constitutions authorize the courts to engage in rulemaking, dynamic
conformity could test the outer limits of the rulemaking authority. See generally Jack B. Weinstein,
Reform of Court Rule-Making Procedures,4-5 (Ohio State University Press 1977).
18 U.S.C. § 13(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (criminalizing a gambling business which is "a
violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted").
U.S. v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958); see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of
Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. Rev. 825, 867 n. 195 (2005).
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shall have been already put in effect by the respective States for their
55
own government.
In fact, the Supreme Court has never held the prospective incorporation of state law by
56
Congress to be unconstitutional.
Although the constitutionality of a prospective incorporation of federal law by
the state would vary from state to state, there are many examples of state statutes that
rely on the authority of, or in effect delegate authority to federal agencies and statutes.
For example, the Michigan Supreme Court recently upheld a statute that barred
products liability actions for drugs approved by the Federal Food and Drug
Administration, even in the future.57 Wisconsin courts have enforced state legislative
efforts to incorporate future amendments to the Federal Vocational Rehabilitation
Act.5 8 Many state tax regimes prospectively incorporate elements of Federal tax law. 59
And in many jurisdictions, it appears that prospective incorporation is constitutionally
permitted provided the legislative intent is clear. 60
In states less sanguine about the prospective incorporation of another
sovereign's law, however, dynamic conformity statutes could prove much more
problematic. 61 In these jurisdictions, a reformer might be able successfully to
55.

56.

57.
58.
59.

60.
61.

Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 293-294. The Court also cited with approval other examples of prospective
incorporation in federal legislation. See id. at 294-296 (citing cases upholding the constitutionality
of the Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122); the Black Bass
Act, ch. 346, 44 Stat. 576 (1926) (repealed 1981); the Johnson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1171 (1994)).
Bellia, supra n. 54, at 867 n. 195; but see id. ("[Nevertheless,] scholars have argued that there are
theoretical and historical considerations that render the point far from settled.") citing Vikram David
Amar, Indirect Effects of DirectElection: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment,
49 VAND. L. REv. 1347, 1371 (1996) (noting that in Sharpnack, dissenting Justices Douglas and
Black argued that "prospective adoption" of state laws was equivalent "to an unconstitutional
abdication of federal legislative authority"); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a
System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1484-1485 (2000) (explaining that one of
these considerations is the "nondelegation doctrine").
Taylor v. Smithkline Beecham, 658 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 2003).
See Dane Co. Hosp. and Home v. Lab. and Indus. Review Commn., 371 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1985) ("In incorporating this federal rehabilitation law, the Wisconsin legislature has not
delegated its legislative authority ... This is not an unconstitutional delegation.").
See e.g. ParkerAffiliated Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 415 N.E.2d 825, 831 (Mass. 1981) (citing cases);
see generally Jim Rossi, InstitutionalDesign and The Lingering Legacy of Antifederal Separationof
Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1236 (1999) ("Courts have upheld state
legislature delegations of authority to a federal agency, including future lawmaking authority, even
where the state nondelegation doctrine has not been met."). For example, in McFaddin v. Jackson,
the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld a statute that made individual retirement plans taxable if
subject to the federal estate tax, but exempt if excluded from the federal estate tax. 738 S.W.2d 176,
176-177 (Tenn. 1987).
See e.g. A. L Campbell, Jr.v. T.D. Hunt, 155 S.E.2d 682, 684 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); Haw. Providers
Network, Inc. v. AIG Haw. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 233, 241 (Haw. 2004); SuburbanSav. & Loan Assn. v.
Commr. of Banking of State of N.J., 375 A.2d 1185, 1191 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1977).
See e.g. Scappaticci v. S.W. Sav. & Loan Assn., 662 P.2d 131, 134 (Ariz. 1983) ("The Arizona
Legislature can incorporate by reference only such laws and regulations as exist at the time they
enact legislation and cannot constitutionally adopt future changes which might occur."); Clemens v.
Harvey, 525 N.W.2d 185, 189 (Neb. 1994) (rejecting prospective adoption of Social Security Act;
"the adoption of an act of Congress to be passed in the future would be an unconstitutional attempt
on the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative authority to Congress").
Some jurisdictions send mixed messages. Compare People v. Kruger,48 Cal. App. Supp.
3d 15, 19 (1975) ("It is, of course, perfectly valid to adopt Existing statutes, rules, or regulations of
Congress or of another state, by reference; but the attempt to make Future regulations of another
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distinguish the prospective incorporation of procedural rules from the dynamic
incorporation of substantive law; given the so-called auxiliary nature of procedure, the
delegation of rulemaking authority to another sovereign may be perceived as
qualitatively different. More persuasively, I think, reformers could emphasize the
unique significance of achieving procedural uniformity. 62 For example, in In re
Lasswell,63 a California Court of Appeals upheld a state statute which in effect adopted
the National Industrial Recovery Act and provided that when Federal authorities fixed
a code for the operation of any interstate industry, that code automatically became the
state code therefor. The court reasoned that the relation of state and interstate
industrial and unemployment emergencies justified uniformity of code provisions. 64
Of course an amendment to the state constitution is the last resort. Indeed, it appears
that some states, in the interest of uniformity and simplification, have felt that it was
65
desirable and necessary to effect constitutional reform.
A third technical issue concerns the possibility of some sort of recursive loop
if the Federal Rules presume a separately functioning procedural system but through
conformity the state simply refers back to the federal system. But with so much
experience with state conformity already, this seems to pose no real obstacle.
Relatedly, parts of Rules that the state is without the authority to. enforce would need
to be addressed in the customization. Federal Rule 4(k) is one such example. But
66
again, many states have already tackled such issues.

IV.

CONTEMPLATING THE ANOMALY

It is understandable why people expect to see an engineer sitting in the engine
of a moving train. And it is understandable why the citizens of a state would expect a
state procedural rulemaking enterprise. But when the trains and rules are, as a
practical matter, being controlled remotely, the allocation of resources could be
questioned, the force reduced, and a sign hung. But although the sign hangs at the
train station in Sacramento, California, where electronically-controlled trains move
about, state rulemaking committees diligently and conscientiously assume their posts.

62.

63.
64.
65.
66.

jurisdiction part of the state law is generally held to be unconstitutional.") with State School Bldg.
Fin. Comm. v. Betts, 216 Cal. App. 2d 685, 692 (1963) ("Incorporation by reference of the law
generally on a particular subject includes not only the contemporary law but future amendments.");
see generally Dean v. Kuchel, 37 Cal.2d 97, 100 (advising that Constitutional language should not
be construed as a limitation on legislative power in the absence of a clearly stated restriction).
See Charles A. Warren, FederalProcess and State Legislation, 16 VA. L. REv. 546, 562-564 (1930)
(noting that the Supreme Court in 1872, 1875, and 1887 did not question Conformity Act's
constitutionality but rather saw it as reducing the inconvenience of having to follow different
procedures in state and federal courts of the same locality).
1 Cal. App. 2d 183 (1934).
Id. See also People ex rel. Prattv. Goldfogle, 242 N.Y. 277 (1926); Commonwealth v. Alderman,
119 A. 551 (Pa. 1923).
See N.Y. Const. art. 3 § 22; Colo. Const. art. 10, § 19; see also Anderson v. Tiemann, 155 N.W.2d
322 (Neb. 1967).
See Rowe, supra n. 16.
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If conformity statutes could be useful and can be enacted, why aren't they
more popular? Although we find prospective incorporation in certain limited contexts
explored above, why isn't there at least one state with a conformity statute linking a
state's ethical code or rules of evidence or commercial law or civil procedure rules to
the various extant Model Rules, Uniform Rules, Federal Rules, and so forth?
Importantly, the answer to that question is not that the states reject those other regimes
wholesale; to the contrary, the states tend to adopt much of them, albeit episodically
67
and statically.
Opposition to conformity statutes can be dressed up as a federalism argument
with emphasis on the sovereign role of states. To be sure, some states might have their
own agenda, an active rulemaking apparatus, and an end product of which they should
be proud. But for jurisdictions that instead have state rules that are but bastards,
orphans, runaways, and clones of the federal or model rules, neither state pride nor a
superior end-product can justify their approach. Remember that dynamic conformity
statutes do not prevent intended deviations on the part of state rule makers wary of a
federal rule: a state can slow the train, stop the train, or switch to stagecoaches at any
point in time.
Tradition, culture, politics, and economics may be among those forces that
repress consideration of conformity statutes. One strand of that resistance may also be
the currency of a narrative that tells a cautionary tale about conformity statutes.
Conformity statutes prescribed the procedure in law cases in federal courts for more
than one hundred and forty years. But once conformity was rejected and replaced in
the 1930s, the historical narrative is frequently reduced to something short and sour:
the conformity acts failed. 68 A fuller account of that history appears in the next two
parts.

67.
68.

See authorities cited in supra nn. 2-6.
See e.g. James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and The
Rule of Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 517, 566 (2006) ("The Conformity Act... hardly lived up to its
name and itself led to considerable uncertainty."); Mary Margaret Penrose & Dace A. Caldwell, A
Short and Plain Solution to the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains
PropheticallyCorrectAbout Special Pleadingand the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REv. 971, 1004 n. 187
(2005) ("This system was quickly perceived as 'highly unsatisfactory.") (citation and quotation
omitted); Amy E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential
Opinions By Statute or ProceduralRule, 79 IND. L.J. 711 (2004) ("The Conformity Act failed to
achieve its purpose."); Main, supra n. 18, at 470 n. 250 ("Most people agreed that the Conformity
Act was a failure."); Fleming, James, Jr. et al., Civil Procedure § 1.8 at 23-24 (5th ed. 2001)
(Conformity Act "caused great disuniformity in practice among the federal courts."); David Shapiro,
Federal Rules 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. Rv.1969, 1974
(1989) (Act did "not result [ I in uniformity"). Perhaps even more ignominious for the Conformity
Act is the treatment given this history in some of the civil procedure casebooks; see e.g. Jack H.
Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure: Cases and Materials (9th ed., West/Thomson/Foundation Press
2005) 450-497 (ignoring the Conformity Acts in a 47-page chapter about "The Development of
Modem Procedure").
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V.

RECOUNTING THE BASICS

Experimentation with the idea of conformity occurred very early in our
nation's history. Congress passed the first Process Act of September 29, 1789,69 to
prescribe the forms of writs and process for the new federal courts (in suits at common
law). It provided:
That until further provision shall be made, and except where by this
act or other statutes of the United States is otherwise provided, the
forms of writs and executions, except their style, and modes of process
and rate of fees, except fees to judges, in the circuit and district courts,
as
in suits at common law, shall be the same in each state respectively
70
are now used or allowed in the Supreme Courts of the same.
Conformity was intended "to allay as far as possible jealousy between the State and
71
Federal Governments and to relieve the fears of encroachment by the latter."
The first Process Act was to be a temporary measure, so Congress revisited
federal procedure in its subsequent sessions. 72 Congress considered other approaches
to rulemaking, including giving the Supreme Court the authority to promulgate
uniform federal rules, 73 yet ultimately chose conformity again in the Permanent
Process Act of May 7, 1792. 74 This Act prescribed conformity in the "forms and
modes of proceeding," but was subject to "alteration by the respective courts or by
rules which the Supreme Court of the United States might think proper to prescribe for
'75
the other courts of the United States.
For decades the federal courts, following a "course of prudence and duty" and
in a "spirit of moderation and comity," conformed as nearly as practicable to the
administration of justice in the state courts. 76 But two sources of friction had emerged:
first, the Process Act was thought to prescribe conformity to state law as of 1789; 77 and
second, the Process Act applied only to the thirteen original States. With regard to the
latter, the federal courts often conformed to the practice in the new states even without
a mandate.78 But the former proved more problematic: the federal court could either
adopt the state practice through rules of court 79 or "conform" to a state practice even
when that practice was no longer recognized in the state of its origin.80 Eventually, the
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

76.
77.
78.
79.

80.

1 Stat. 93, Ist Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 29, 1789).
1 Stat. 93, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 29, 1789).
Charles Warren, FederalProcess and State Legislation, 16 VA. L. REv. 421, 427 (1929-1930).
See id.
See 1 Annals of Cong. 1886 (1790); Report of the Attorney General, Dec. 27, 1790; Warren, supra
n. 71, at 427-434.
1 Stat. 275, 2d Cong., 1st Sess. (May 8, 1792).
Id. Similar rulemaking authority was accorded the federal courts in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789. Further, a 1793 statute broadened this authority in more explicit terms. See 1 Stat. 335, 2d
Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 2, 1793).
Fullerton v. Bank of the U.S., 26 U.S. 604, 614 (1828).
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 32 (1825).
Warren, supra n. 71, at 435-436.
See text accompanying supra n. 75.
See e.g. Homer v. Brown, 57 U.S. 354 (1854).
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new states and new laws prompted two more acts-in 1828 and 1842 8 1-to update
federal practice. However, recognizing "the danger of providing for conformity with
future and necessarily unknown and unknowable state legislation," these acts, too,
provided only for strict conformity as of the date of the legislation.8 2 To adopt state
law as it would develop in the future, Chief Justice Marshall thought problematic since
it could amount to states regulating the procedures governing federal courts.8 3
However, federal courts were still vested with the authority to enact rules adopting
state practices.
"From 1828 to 1872 the Federal Courts adapted their practice and processes to
those of the States without much difficulty."8 4 One reason for the success of this
system was the fact that, in general, up to the year 1848, the principles of common law
pleading prevailed throughout the states.85 But adaptation slowed once "reformed" or
code pleading was introduced in several states.8 6 Some federal courts embraced the
codes to remain in lockstep with the states, "while in other states, common law
procedure ruled in federal court from the graveyard of static conformity."s 7 Hence an
increasing number of lawyers thus found it necessary to master-or at least to become
familiar with-procedural systems that were fundamentally different.88
On June 1, 1872, a new federal process act was passed to address the
inconsistency resulting from optional static conformity under the earlier acts.
That the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in
other than equity and admiralty causes in the circuit and district courts
of the United States shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice,
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceedings existing at the time in
like causes in the courts of record of the state within which such
circuit or district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary
89
notwithstanding.
81.

88.

See 4 Stat. 278, 20th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 19, 1828); 5 Stat. 499, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 1,
1842).
Edgar B. Tolman, The Origin of the Conformity Idea, Its Development, the Failure of the
Experiment, the Evils Which Resulted Therefrom, and the Curefor Those Evils, 23 ABA J. 971, 972
(1937).
See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825).
Warren, supra n. 71, at 557. See also Tolman, supra n. 82, at 972 ("The faults inherent in the
general conformity act did not manifest themselves to any serious extent, so long as the state
practice continued to follow the English pattern.").
See generally Joseph H. Koffler & Alison Reppy, Handbook of Common Law Pleading, 19-27
(1969); Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A HistoricalAnalysis of an
EarlierProceduralVision, 6 LAW & HIST. REv. 311 (1988).
Id.; Charles E. Clark, The Challenge of a New Federal Civil Procedure,20 CORNELL L.Q. 443, 446
(1934-1935). After New York adopted its Code of Civil Procedure, the spread of the codes
proceeded in two waves: with twenty states adopting code pleading by the end of Reconstruction; a
second wave near the end of the nineteenth century led to adoptions in a handful of additional states.
See Henry Upton Sims, The Problem of Reforming Procedure,21 YALE L. J. 215, 216 (1911-1912).
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1038-1039 (1982).
For federal cases critical of the codes, see e.g. Randon v. Toby, 11 How. 493, 517 (1850); McFaul v.
Ramsey, 20 How. 523 (1858). Professor Warren suggests that the Court's criticism of the codes
prevented several states from adopting them. See Warren, supra n. 71, at 560.
Charles Hepburn, The HistoricalDevelopment of Code Pleading, 153 (W.H. Anderson & Co. 1897).

89.

17 Stat. 196.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

87.
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Although there was some debate about whether the "notwithstanding" proviso
90
abrogated the whole of the court's rulemaking power under earlier acts, the thrust of
the act was to replace static conformity with dynamic conformity.
Under the new Conformity Act, the federal courts were obliged to conform
automatically their action "as near as may be" to any procedure which then existed or
which might in the future exist in the State Courts. 9' The Act has surprisingly little
legislative history. 92 But, as the Supreme Court declared:
The purpose of the provision is apparent upon its face. No analysis is
necessary to reach it. It was to bring about uniformity in the law of
procedure in the Federal and State courts of the same locality. It had
its origin in the code enactments of many of the States. While in the
Federal tribunals the common-law pleadings, forms, and practice were
adhered to, in the State courts of the same district the simpler forms of
the local code prevailed. This involved the necessity on the part of the
bar of studying two distinct systems of remedial law, and of practicing
according to the wholly dissimilar requirements of both. The
inconvenience of such a state of things is obvious. The evil was a
serious one. It was the aim of the provision in question to remove it.
This was done by bringing about the conformity in the courts93of the
United States which it prescribes. The remedy was complete.
The notion of dynamic conformity seems to have been well-received at the outset of
94
this new era.
But the honeymoon was short. An 1876 editorial in the American Law Review
explained: "[t]he simplification attempted by the Practice Act [of 1872] has not been
protective of the results hoped. On the whole, the practice has become looser but not
96
really easier." 95 A decade later a bill was introduced to repeal the Conformity Act.
That proposal failed, but discontent grew in an atmosphere of uncertainty and
confusion regarding when federal courts conformed and when they did not:
The ambiguities that grew up around the Conformity Act made federal
practice confusing and frustrating. "When removed," protested a
Missouri lawyer in 1927, "the case will be tried in a court in which the
90.

91.
92.
93.

94.
95.
96.

Compare Tolman, supra n. 82, at 972 and Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Court Rule-Making
Procedures,4-5 (Ohio State University Press 1977) with Armistead Dobie, Handbook of Federal
Jurisdictionand Procedure, 587 (West 1928); Subrin, supra n. 17, at 2012 & n. 65 (1989). The
Conformity Act did not limit the court's authority to make rules for equity cases, see § 917 of the
Revised Statutes of 1878; procedure in equity was always on a separate track and were never subject
to a conformity mandate. See Main, supra n. 6 (many states didn't have equity courts); Burbank,
supra n. 87, at 1039-1040.
Warren, supra n. 71, at 562.
Id. at 562.
Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441 (1875); see also Lamaster v. Keeler, 123 U.S. 376, 387 (1887)
("The new codes of procedure did not require an accurate knowledge of the intricacies of common
law pleading; and to obviate the embarrassment following the use of different systems in the two
courts the section mentioned of the act of 1872 was adopted.").
See e.g. 6 AM. L. REv. 748 (1872).
As quoted in Warren, supra n. 71, at 564 n. 53.
See 18 AM. L. REv. 464 (1884). The bill prescribed that the equity rules would have applied in law
cases. See Warren, supra n. 71, at 567-568 n. 65.
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law is administered in many respects vitally different from a state
court." Removal, a California attorney complained ambiguities that
grew up around the conformity Act made federal practice five years
later, forced attorneys to confront "the intricate mazes of Federal
practice and procedure." In the federal courts, concluded one scholar,
procedural "principles and their applications are often hazy and
uncertain, and they vary widely in the different states." Successful
navigation through trial required either long familiarity with the local
federal practice or some preventive research. Reliance on procedural
"conformity" proved as often a trap as a guide to attorneys who
appeared in the federal courts only rarely. The great majority of
lawyers, including most of those who represented poorer individuals
in ordinary tort and contract actions, fell into that last category. The
attorneys who represented corporations and who frequently or
97
habitually removed often did not.
By the turn of the twentieth century, there was considerable
anti-conformity-act rhetoric. A "distinguished commentator" said the decisions under
the Conformity Act and its predecessors amounted to "hideous confusion and shifting
uncertainty. 98 A federal practitioner "even in his own state, f[elt] no more certainty as
to the proper procedure than if he were before a tribunal of a foreign country." 99 "To
the average lawyer it is Sanskrit; to the experienced federal practitioner it is monopoly;
to the author of text books on federal practice it is a golden harvest."' 10 0
The criticism was not unanimous, however. In fact, contemporaneous with the
proposal to repeal the Conformity Act, was another committee's suggestion that the
Conformity Act be extended to apply to suits in equity as well as those at law. 10 1
Many members of the bar, of the judiciary, and of Congress defended the Conformity
Act against its attackers. 10 2 Senator Thomas Walsh, the progressive Senator from
Montana, insisted that "conformity with state procedural law worked quite well for the
vast majority of lawyers."' 1 3 Even an informal poll of federal judges in 1926, favored
the status quo by a margin of 2-1 over a proposal to replace conformity with uniform
10 4
federal rules.
97.

98.
99.

Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Litigation and Inequality, 54 (Oxford 1992) (citing Letter from Edwin A.
Krauthoff to George W. Norris, (Oct. 18, 1927), George W. Norris Papers, Tray 42, Box 2, Filed:
"S. 3151 (70th)," Library of Congress; Letter from Matthew A. McCullough to George W. Norris,
(Jan. 18, 1932)), George W. Norris Papers, Library of Congress, Box 198, File: "Limiting
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts (71st and 72nd) Congress; Dobie, Handbook of FederalJurisdiction,
at 580).
Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 54, at 369-370 (5th ed., West 1994).
Burbank, supra n. 87, at 1041 (quoting Report of ABA. Committee on Uniformity of Procedureand

Comparative Law, 19 Am. Bar Assn. Rep. 411, 420 (1896)).
100. Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure,46 Am. Bar Assn. Rep. 461, 466 (1921).
101. See 8 Am. Bar Assn. Rep. 66 et seq. 323. The report was signed by David Dudley Field, among
others. See Warren, supra n. 71, at 568 & n. 67.

102. See Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, FederalRules and Common

Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 693, 693 (1988); Burbank, supra n. 87, at 1041 nn. 107-108 (1982).
103. Subrin, supra n. 17, at 2007; see also Subrin, supra n. 9, at 943 n. 200 ("proposals for uniform civil
federal rules were defeated during this period, in large measure because most lawyers and
congressmen apparently thought the Conformity Act ...

worked tolerably well").

104. Subrin, supra n. 9, at 958 n. 284.
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But the gainsayers ultimately prevailed in 1934, when "the hideous conformity
act was relegated to the limbo of 'old, unhappy, far off things.' ' 10 5 Professor
Sunderland, with a eulogy befitting a despot, remarked: "[N]o tears will be shed by the
bar of this country over the fact that the immense body of judicial decisions as to what
matters are or are not controlled by the conformity act, no longer have any value
10 6
except for the legal historian."

VI.

REVISITING THE FAILURE

In this part, I explore in greater detail the failure-or perceived failure-of the
Conformity Act of 1872. This effort does not unearth the history to declare a winner
in the battle between those who attacked conformity and those who defended it. An
autopsy of that kind would likely reveal that both the virtues and vices of conformity
were exaggerated. The exercise undertaken here is to identify the separate strains of
criticism with an eye toward understanding whether the same pathogens would infect
state statutes conforming state procedure to federal procedure. For discussion
purposes, the fault lines of the Conformity Act of 1872 are grouped into four
overlapping categories.
A.

The Approximation Mandate

For some, the "great difficulty" under the Conformity Act was the lack of a
precise statutory mandate.1 07 The act conformed the federal practice, pleadings, and
forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes at law to the state model only "'as near
as may be'-not as near as may be possible, nor even as near as near as may be
' 0 8 Of
practicable."'
course this vagueness was intentional-designed to allow enough
flexibility to avoid injustice or inconvenience that a literal reading might require. 10 9
But because the exact nature of the limitation was not easily defined, conformity was
unpredictable.' 10 Justice Swayne identified examples both inside and outside the
statutory mandate in an 1876 opinion:
Where a state law, in force when the act was passed, has abolished the
different forms of action, and the forms of pleading appropriate to
them, and has substituted a simple petition or complaint setting forth
the facts, and prescribed the subsequent proceedings of pleading or
practice to raise the issues of law or fact in the case, such law is
105. Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,25 VA. L. REV. 261, 262 (1939).
106. See Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. & B. 5, 6 (1938); see also
Thomas Wall Shelton, Uniform Judicial Procedure-LetCongress Set the Supreme Court Free, 73

CENT. L.J., 319, 319 (1911) (cited in Burbank, supra n. 102, at 1111).
107. Clark, supra n. 86, at 451.

108. See Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 301 (1876).

109. See id. at 301 ("This indefiniteness may have been suggested for a purpose."); Mexican C. Ry. Co. v.
Rinkney, 149 U.S. 194, 207 (1893) ("it would not be practicable, without injustice or inconvenience,
to conform literally to the entire practice prescribed for its own courts by a state in which federal
courts might be sitting").
110. Hepburn, supra n. 88, § 182 at 158.
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undoubtedly obligatory upon the courts of the United States in that
locality. There may be other things, not necessary now to be specified,
with respect to which also it is binding. But where it prescribes the
manner in which the judge shall discharge his duty in charging the
jury, or the papers which he shall permit to go to them in retirement,
as in Nudd v. Burrows, or that he shall require the jury to answer
special interrogatories in addition to their general verdict, as in this
case, we hold that such provisions zre not within the intent and
meaning of the act of Congress, and have no application to the courts
of the United States.11 1
Following Justice Swayne's lead, conformity applied "in the main to the pleading
stage of the trial"-and in fact, within that sphere, generated "a very considerable
' 12
degree of conformity."
Further perspective about practice under the Conformity Act is offered in
Jurisdiction and Procedure in United States Courts, a book authored by attorney
Robert M. Hughes and published in 1906-around the midpoint of the Act's tenure.
In the hornbook, Mr. Hughes discusses the relevance of the Conformity Act as to each
of fifteen stages of procedure in law cases:
Process. "Except as to the method of signature [which is prescribed by
federal statute] ... the form of the process in the state courts on the
common-law side can be used in the federal courts."
Attachments. "The state attachment laws in force on June 1, 1872,
and any later ones adopted by rule of court, are available in the federal
courts in common-law causes, except as against a nonresident not
personally served in the district."
Appearances. "[T]he federal courts have a discretion to disregard this
provision of the state court."
Parties. "The rules as to parties to actions are substantially similar to
those prevailing in the state courts of the locality, subject to certain
exceptions incident to the nature of the federal courts and the character
of their jurisdiction."
Pleading. "The pleading in the federal courts is substantially similar
to that in the state courts of the locality."
Continuances. "The granting or refusing of a continuance in a federal
court is a matter of discretion with the judge."
Trial. "The making up of the jury in the federal courts is largely under
the court's control, and it may adopt the state practice or not, as it
thinks fit."
Evidence. "The evidence in the federal courts is taken in a manner
similar to that prevailing in the state courts, except that the federal
111. Indianapolis,93 U.S. at 300 (citing Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426 (1875)); Indianapolis,93 U.S. at
301; Sherry v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 72 Fed. 565, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1895).
112. Clark, supra n. 86, at 452.
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courts have certain rules of their own relating to the taking of
depositions."
Instructions to Jury. "In instructing a jury the federal courts are not
bound by the state practice . . . [Also, a] federal judge may direct a
verdict where the facts are undisputed, or the preponderance of
evidence is so strong that reasonable men should not differ as to the
deductions to be drawn from it."
Bill of Exceptions. "In the form and other procedure relating to such
bills the federal courts have their own rules, and do not regard the
state practice."
Verdict. "The federal courts, though not compelled to do so, conform
in a general way to the practice of the state courts in relation to the
form of, and rules governing the verdict; but they are not bound by
state statutes requiring the courts to submit to the jury special
questions of fact, and requiring the jury to make special findings in
pursuance of such submissions.
Motion for New Trial. "The federal courts follow the usual practice of
common-law courts in regard to new trials, and do not feel bound in
this respect by state practice."
Motion in Arrest of Judgment. "The practice of the federal courts in
respect to motions in arrest of judgment corresponds to the general
common-law doctrine."
Judgment. "While the federal courts will follow the state practice as to
the mere form of the judgment, their control over it from that time
forward is regulated by the federal decisions and statutes, and not by
the state practice.
Execution. "State remedies, in the nature of execution in force on June
1, 1872, and any later ones adopted by rule of court, are available in
113
the federal courts in common-law causes."

This perspective, too, suggests that there was substantial conformity at the
earlier stages of litigation, and greater divergence at the later stages. But interestingly,
Hughes does not present the divergence as particularly problematic or complicated for
federal court practitioners. Indeed, in a 600-page volume about federal court practice,
he allocates only twenty-two pages to the procedure in law cases.114
113. Robert M. Hughes, Handbook of Jurisdiction and Procedure in United States Courts, 355-357
(West 1904).
114. The Chapters in the book are as follows: Of the Source of Federal Jurisdiction and the Law
Administered by Federal Courts; The District Court-Its Criminal Jurisdiction and Practice; The
District Court-Criminal Jurisdiction-Miscellaneous Jurisdiction; The District CourtBankruptcy; The District Court-Miscellaneous Jurisdiction; The Circuit Court-Original
Jurisdiction; The Circuit Court-Jurisdiction by Removal; Procedure in the Ordinary Federal Courts
of Original Jurisdiction-Courts of Law; Procedure in the Ordinary Federal Courts of Original
Jurisdiction-Courts of Equity; Appellate Jurisdiction-The Circuit Court of Appeals; Appellate
Jurisdiction-The Supreme Court; Procedure on Error and Appeal.
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Of course publication of the handbook coincides with Roscoe Pound's famous
speech fomenting an agenda of reform that led ultimately to the replacement of
11 5
conformity with uniform federal rules three decades letter. That reform movement
116
had reason to reveal (if not also exaggerate) the failures of conformity; to that end,
reformers published lists of cases documenting the "Instances of Failure to Conform to
State Practice." 117 Items on such lists typically included matters pertaining to
121 enforcement of
service, 118 evidence,119 trial procedure, 120 post-trial motions,
123
122
judgments, and the like.
On one hand, even the lengthy lists enumerating the "notable exceptions to
conformity" 124 may not convey the true variation since there was no way of knowing
beforehand what the determination would be. 2 5 Each application invoked the broad
discretion of the trial judge. Hence, the items on one list of "exceptions" could be
found on another's list of examples of conformity.12 6 The common characteristic of
the vast majority of appellate decisions from this era is that the trial court's exercise of
discretion was affirmed.1 27 Even appellate decisions, then, failed to establish definite

contours of conformity.
On the other hand, however, the lists also suggest that the uncertainty was a
transitional phenomenon that had largely resolved itself. For example, the list of
"Instances of Failure to Conform to State Practice" included in a 1920 ABA report is
simply recycled over the course of the next decade.1 28 One might have expected the
"evils" of conformity to spawn. 29 Even more telling, the most recent identified
115. See generally Subrin, supra n. 9.
116. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1677, 1692 (2004) (suggesting reformers "had an incentive to paint with a
broad brush"); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural
Progress,59 BROOK. L. REv. 761, 782 (1993) (referring to the reformers' "inflammatory bombast"
about the "supposed crisis" under the Conformity Act); Subrin, supra n. 17, at 2007 (chronicling the
debate).
117. Report of the Committee, supra n. 27, at 514, 525-527.
118. See e.g. Bracken v. Union P. Ry. Co., 56 Fed. 447 (8th Cir. 1893); Shepard v. Adams, 168 U.S. 618
(1898); Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202 (1892); Mexican C. Ry., 149 U.S. 194.
119. See e.g. Union P. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Potter v. Natl. Bank, 102 U.S. 163
(1880); King v. Worthington, 104 U.S. 44 (1881); Whitford v. Clark Co., 119 U.S. 522 (1886); Ex
parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1885).
120. See e.g. City of Lincoln v. Power, 151 U.S. 436 (1894); U.S. Mut. Accident Assn. v. Barry, 131 U.S.
100 (1889); Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S. 581 (1878).
121. See e.g. Newcomb, 97 U.S. 581.
122. See e.g. Atd. & P. R. Co. v. Hopkins, 94 U.S. 11 (1876).
123. See e.g. Nudd, 91 U.S. 426 (1875); Vicksburg & M.R.R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545 (1886); St.
Louis. L M. & S. R. Co. v. Wickers, 122 U.S. 360 (1887); City of Lincoln, 151 U.S. 436; Patton v.
U.S., 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Am. Publg. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897); Brewer v. Jacobs,
22 Fed. 217 (1884)
124. Report of the Committee, supra n. 27.
125. Conformity by Federal Courts to State Procedure, 35 HARV. L. REv. 602, 604-606 (1921-1922).
126. See e.g. Report of the Committee, supra n. 27; Conformity by Federal Courts, supra n. 125.
127. See cases cited in supra nn. 118-123.
128. See ABA, supra n. 27 at 525; Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 50 ABA
Rep. 539, 557 (1925); Report of the Committee on Uniform JudicialProcedure, 54 ABA Rep. 514,
523 (1929). See generally Burbank, supra n. 87, at 1067-1068 ("From 1920 through 1929, the core
of the ABA Committee's annual report remained the same from year to year.").
129. Please note the title of Tolman, supra n. 82.
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"failure" on these lists is a case from 1898-which was well over twenty years before
publication of the list.13a Indeed, with only three exceptions, all of the cited cases are
3
from at least thirty years prior.' '
Given the dubious mechanism for effecting dynamic conformity under the
1872 act, one actually would expect even more profound problems. Turning our
attention to the proposed state conformity legislation, an approximation mandate is
unnecessary. Indeed, a statute along the lines of that proposed in Part I would generate
textual rules rather than approximating language requiring judicial interpretation. This
option was unavailable to the Congress enacting the Conformity Act of 1872 because
that legislation imposed conformity to each of thirty-seven different sources (states).
Although the textual rules themselves may, of course, be subject to varying
interpretations, 132 there would be no question as to the rules' applicability in the state
proceeding.
B.

The Legislative Scope

A related fault line that contributed to the demise of the conformity regime
was the scope of the legislation. By its terms, the Conformity Act applied only to
circuit and district courts. 13 3 So it did not control the manner of obtaining a review 34
nor did it undertake to prescribe appellate procedure. 3 5 Moreover, the statute required
conformity (or, more precisely, conformity "as near as may be") regarding only the
"practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding."' 13 6 Accordingly it was not
obvious whether matters pertaining to the administration of the trial-including jury
instructions, new trial motions, verdict forms, evidentiary issues, and other matters
discussed in the immediately preceding section-were even within the intended scope
of the statute. Much like the approximating language "as near as may be" invited
contention, the scope of the words practice, pleadings, and forms, and modes all
required attention.
130. See authorities cited in supra n. 128.
131. Similar to the suggestion in the text accompanying supra nn. 86-88, it is important to note that the
adoption of code pleading ceased in 1897. So again, once the source procedure stabilized, the
problems with conformity may have subsided.
132. See Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate,59 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 1155, 1159 (1993); Stephen Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1463,
1474 (1986-1987) (book review); Main, supra n. 6.
133. The circuit courts contemplated by the Conformity Act since have been eliminated.
134. It would seem that unfamiliarity with federal procedure as to obtaining a review would be just as
prevalent, and would prejudice a litigant as much as unfamiliarity with any other step in the
proceedings. It is, however, well established that the Conformity Act does not apply here. Fishburn
v. Chi. M. & S. P. R. Co., 137 U.S. 60 (1890) (bill of exceptions); Chi. Life Ins. Co. v. Tiernan, 263
Fed. 325, 330 (8th Cir. 1920) (motion for a new trial not a condition precedent to a review);
McBride v. Neal, 214 Fed. 966 (7th Cir. 1914) (writ of error).
135. Appellate proceedings are governed entirely by acts of Congress, the common law, and ancient
English statutes. Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308, 317 (1919); McKeon v. C. Stamping Co., 264 Fed.
385 (3d Cir. 1920).
136. See supra nn. 91-97 and accompanying text.
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Further, even were the mandate in the Conformity Act crystal clear, there
would have persisted ambiguity because of Section 918 of the Revised Statutes which
read:
The several circuit and district courts may, from time to time, and in
any manner not inconsistent with any law of the United States, or with
any rule prescribed by the Supreme Court under the preceding section,
make rules and orders directing the returning of writs and processes,
the filing of pleadings, the taking of rules, the entering and making up
of judgments by default, and other matters in vacation, and otherwise
regulate their own practice as may be necessary or convenient for the
advancement of justice and the prevention of delays in proceedings. 137
Judges thus had the discretion to conform only "as near as may be" under the
Conformity Act and the court also deviate by adopting a rule.
And further still, the Conformity Act did not apply to the large number of
matters regarding practice and procedure already the subject of Congressional
legislation. 138 For example, because Congress had legislated directly upon the mode of
proof in the trial of actions at law-it must be "by oral testimony and examination of
witnesses in open court, except as hereinafter provided."' 139 So, generally, in the
matter of the competency of witnesses, the mode of examination, the production and
admissibility of evidence, the federal courts were not bound by the rules and usages
that governed the state courts. 140 Congress has legislated upon a large number of
matters, such as the disregarding of defects of form and allowance of amendment,
consolidation of cases of a like nature, when the right to litigate in forma pauperis
exists, when and how service by publication may be had, the time when the defendant
in a removed case must plead, and so on in a wide variety of situations. 41
Returning to consideration of the proposed state conformity legislation, again
it would appear that such challenges would not be present since the proposed regime
produces an actual corpus of rules, rather than an ambiguous conformity mandate.
However, the rules generated by the regime could conflict with other state statutes
137. 17 Stat. 196.
138. Goldey v. Morn. News, 156 U.S. 518 (1898); Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1879); Hills & Co. v.
Hoover, 220 U.S. 329 (1911); Chappell v. U.S., 160 U.S. 499 (1896); Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co.,
147 U.S. 337 (1893); Allnut v. Lancaster, 76 Fed. Rptr. 131, 134 (1896); Chappell, 160 U.S. 499,
513 (1896); Seeley v. Kan. City Co., 71 Fed. Rptr. 554 (1896); King v. Worthington, 104 U.S. 44,50
(1881); Exparte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 720 (1884); Randall v. Venable, 17 Fed. Rptr. 162, 164 (1883);
Amy v. Watertown, 130 U.S. 301, 304 (1888); Chamberlain v. Mensing, 47 Fed. Rptr. 435, 436
(1891); Lancasterv. Keeler, 123 U.S. 376, 388 (1877); Citizens' Bank v. Farwell,56 Fed. Rptr. 570,
573 (1893).
139. U.S. Rev. Stats. § 861; cf. Ib., § 863.
140. See Whitford v. Clark Co., 119 U.S. 522, 525 (1886); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S.
70 (1927); Davis Cleveland C.C. & St. P. Ry., 217 U.S. 157 (1910); Union P. R.R. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250 (1891); see also Hanks DentalAssn. v. Intl. Tooth Crown Co., 194 U.S. 303 (1904). In the
federal courts, questions of admissibility of evidence in civil common law cases are governed by
§ 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, U.S. Rev. Stat. § 751 (1878), 28 U.S.C.A. § 725 (1928);
questions of the competency of witnesses in civil cases are governed by the provisions of U.S. Rev.
Stat. § 858 (1878) as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 631 (1928); see Leach, State Law of Evidence in
Federal Courts, 43 HARV. L. REv. 574 (1930).
141. Clark, supra n. 86, at 451-452.
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effected through the standard legislative process. As stated in Part II, this would
require certain maxims of interpretation to determine the relative priority.
C.

The Limitations of Federal Courts

Yet another related category of issues that plagued the Conformity Act is the
unique status of federal district courts. These trial courts are ordained and established
by Congress, vested only with the jurisdiction and authority given to them by Congress
(and that which arises by necessary implication). 142 Accordingly, these courts could
not follow a state practice which changed the limits of their jurisdiction, nor one which
conflicted with a federal procedural statute. 143 Further, the Constitution and federal
substantive statutes are binding on the federal courts and they cannot conform to a
state practice when the result would be to deprive a litigant of any benefit of any
Constitutional guarantee or right created by Act of Congress. 44 Although a read of the
cases invoking this meme of limited jurisdiction yields little to suggest a genuine
concern about overreaching, 45 the refrain is compelling nonetheless.
Of course the authority of state courts is more generalized, limited instead by
state constitutional law. Issues that might arise under state constitutions were discussed
in Part II.
D.

The Separation of Law and Equity

The fourth-and, again related-fault line that undermined the conformity
effort was the merger of law and equity in the code states. 46 The entire conformity
regime was premised on the separation of law and equity, with conformity undertaken
only as to the former. 147 When the codes abolished (or at least purported to abolish)' 4
the distinction between law and equity, conformity to the state procedure in law cases
became a more complicated endeavor. Of course federal judges viewed the code
merger of law and equity as one of the many failings of the reformed procedureundermining the notion of federal conformity to state procedure altogether. 149 But the
merger of law and equity under the codes also meant that state and federal courts were
142. U.S. Const. art. III.
143. Mexican C. Ry. Co., v. Duthie, 189 U.S. 76, 77-78 (1903) (amendment); Chappell v. U.S., 160 U.S.
499, 513 (1896) (manner of trial in condemnation proceedings); S. P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202,
208 (1892) (district in which actions shall be brought); Silvas v. Ariz. Copper Co., 213 Fed. 504,
508-509 (D. Ariz. 1914) (security for costs); Munster v. Weil Corset Co., 261 U.S. 276, 279 (1923);
Meisukas v. Greenough Coal Co., 244 U.S. 54, 58 (1917); Cain v. Com. Publg. Co., 232 U.S. 124,
133-134 (1914); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 112-113 (1898).
144. Conformity by Federal Courts, supra n. 125, at 603.
145. See supra n. 143.
146. Id. See generally Subrin supra n. 9; Main, supra n. 18, at 464-476.
147. See Bennett v. Butterworth, 52 U.S. 669 (1850). Procedure in equity cases was never subject to
conformity. Indeed, because some states did not have equity courts, there would have been no state
equity procedure to serve as a source. Equity was governed by court rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court in 1822, 1842, and 1912. See Main, supra n. 18, at 469-470.
148. See generally George H. Jaffin, Federal ProceduralRevision, 21 VA. L. REv. 504 (1934-1935).
149. See supra nn. 96-100.
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fundamentally different. Federal courts then viewed the distinction between law and
equity as essential and inherent-even required by the United States Constitution:150
"The constitution of the United States requires that the distinction between common
law and equity procedure shall be maintained, and the two jurisdictions cannot be
confused and mixed either by a state statute or rules of the federal court."1 5
Conformity to state procedure thus was perceived by federal courts as not only a bad
idea, but also constitutionally problematic.
Of course, the merger of law and equity has been achieved (or at least
accepted) in the federal courts and in almost all state courts.15 2 Accordingly, this fault
line that contributed to the instability of the conformity regime would not also
destabilize the state conformity legislation proposed in this piece.
VII.

CONCLUSION

My goal in this piece was to explore the feasibility of state legislation
conforming state civil procedure to the federal model. Such reform could be rejected
for three basic reasons: (1) states should instead pursue their own unique, sovereign
interests; (2) federal procedure is a mess and should be rejected by any constituency
with the choice; and (3) conformity statutes do not work.
Reasons (1) and (2) include normative choices, about which I am largely
agnostic in this piece. I have touted certain benefits of intra-state procedural
uniformity. 53 I have observed that substantial intra-state uniformity may already
exist.154 And I have suggested that outsourcing could be accomplished without
foregoing state sovereignty or control over the rulemaking process.1 55 But the
proposal I have outlined here is but an option; states with an agenda and an active
rulemaking apparatus are not subjects of criticism here.
Reason (3) has been my primary focus. I was intrigued by the narrative that
the Conformity Acts failed, and I wondered how 140 years of history under those acts
could be so easily summarized. A cautionary tale about conformity legislation inheres
in that narrative, and I undertook to explore its persuasiveness and relevance. So my
effort was to revisit that history with an eye toward the feasibility of contemporary
conformity statutes-feasibility not for all states, but for some; and not for all regimes
where there is a federal or a model to which states might conform, but perhaps for
some.
My inquiry yields several observations. First, by all accounts practice under
the Process Acts worked quite well until the introduction of code pleading in the latter
150. See e.g. Whittenton Mortg. Co. v. Memphis Packet Co., 19 Fed. 273, 280 (W.D. Tenn. 1883). See
generally Main, supra n. 18.
151. U.S. v. Swan, 65 Fed. 647, 652 (6th Cir. 1895).
152. The federal courts ultimately warmed to the idea of merging law and procedure and undertook the
same reform when promulgating uniform federal rules of civil procedure. See Subrin, supra n. 9.
153. See supra nn. 28-37 and accompanying text.
154. See supra nn. 2-6 and accompanying text.
155. See supra Part IV.
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half of the nineteenth century. 156 Imprudent reform and/or stubborn federal judges
created the patchwork that occasioned the dynamic Conformity Act, which in turn, led
to other problems. 15 7 But when the federal courts were conforming to the familiar and
relatively stable state common law procedures, the regime worked. 15 8 This
observation would seem to bode well for state conformity legislation, given the
relative stability of the federal model. Of course it would also suggest that problems
59
could arise if or when the federal model is substantially revised.1
Second, conformity was problematic. Particularly with regard to the
Conformity Act of 1872, I outlined four overlapping categories of fault lines that were
manifest in cases decided during that era. Courts struggled with the mandate to apply
state practice and procedure "as near as may be" and also struggled to locate that
mandate within a larger universe of statutory and constitutional constraints on their
judicial authority. Although we know that conformity stood in the way of a new
procedure that ushered in an era 160 of judge-made rules that simplified procedure and
merged law and equity, the failures of conformity may have been exaggerated, but not
manufactured.161
But the narrative about these failures of conformity should have little currency
in the context of state legislation pursing state conformity to the federal model. Indeed,
with few exceptions the instances of failure that complicated federal conformity to
state practice are simply irrelevant to the potential for state legislation to effect
dynamic conformity with the Federal Rules. Accordingly, state legislation conforming
state procedure and practice to the Federal Rules appears to be an eminently feasible
option. While remaining largely agnostic as to whether any particular state should
adopt the conformity legislation proposed here, this piece should be part of an ongoing
conversation that suggests that the wisdom of such a course of action should turn on
the suitability of the Federal Rules for state court practice, and not on the viability of
conformity legislation itself.
All aboard?
156.
157.
158.
159.

See supra nn. 76-88 and accompanying text
Id.
Id.
Of course a state is not locked into a conformity regime. The state could change its course at any
time.
160. See supra nn. 115-116 and accompanying text.
161. See supra Part VI.
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